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ABSTRACT
A supercomputer is a repairable system with large number of compute nodes
interconnected to work in harmony to achieve superior computational performance.
Reliability of such a complex system depends on an effective maintenance strategy that
involves both emergency and preventive maintenance. This thesis analyzes the
maintenance records of four supercomputers operational at The National Institute of
Computational Science located at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. We propose to use the
generalized proportional intensities model (GPIM) to model the maintenance interrupts as
it can capture both the reliability parameters and maintenance parameters and allows the
inclusion of both emergency and preventive maintenance. We use this model to obtain the
reliability parameters indicating the system performance and maintenance parameters
indicating the effectiveness of maintenance actions for each of the four supercomputers.
System performance measures such as reliability and availability are used to evaluate the
effectiveness of the existing maintenance policy and to propose a new maintenance policy
that increases the system availability and reduces maintenance cost.
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INTRODUCTION

First, Sections 1.1 and 1.2 provides the background and motivation of the thesis,
respectively. Then, Sections 1.3 and 1.4 discuss the data and methodologies used in this
thesis, respectively. Section 1.5 presents the purpose of the work. Finally, Section 1.6 gives
the structure of this thesis.
1.1

Background

In modern times, human life is being increasingly dependent on various advanced
technologies. There is a growing demand for handling huge data storage, analysis of big
data, implementation of complex algorithms, etc. for addressing modern day problems.
Modelling and simulating different real life scenarios are becoming increasingly important
to scientific predictions. With these growing computational and simulation needs,
supercomputers become necessary and play a critical role in various fields such as nuclear,
oil and gas explorations, environmental studies, medical research, healthcare,
communications, transportation, and so on.
A supercomputer is a system that provides supercomputing capabilities and has the highest
performance with largest capability and capacity in a period of time (Xie, Fang, Hu, & Wu,
2010). The latest supercomputers are capable of reaching one thousand million floating
point operations per second, usually called as one petaflop.
Supercomputer architecture is an interface between hardware, and software and form the
basis for its high computing capability. Supercomputers may run complex algorithms
requiring a relatively long, a few months to solve. Any interruption to its normal
functioning at an intermediate point will require the entire task to be restarted or to start
from the previous checkpoint, if check pointing is possible and implemented. This makes
the supercomputer unavailable not only during the emergency maintenance time, needed
to fix the problem but also the entire period from which the job is started, considering that
it should have successfully completed other smaller jobs during this time. It can be
interrupted due to failures in processors, memory storage devices and other physical
component(s), termed as hardware failures or due to failures in the input/output system and
the interconnect system, termed as software failures. Any of these failures lead to improper
functioning of supercomputer and consequently result in loss of data, termination or pause
of on-going tasks, and so on.
It is of high interest to design a highly dependable supercomputer to run the jobs without
any interruption. With large number of components that can possibly fail and cause
interruption, a supercomputer’s dependability is a function of its reliability, availability and
maintainability (Stearley, 2005). In this aspect, it becomes necessary for a supercomputer
to have an effective maintenance policy that can restore it after a failure and that can
effectively identify and address the incipient failures. In order to maintain the availability
of such a system at a required level, it is important to understand its failure characteristics
and keep a track of the effectiveness of its maintenance policy.
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1.2

Motivation

This work is motivated by the demand to analyze the real time maintenance records of four
supercomputers, namely, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken, which are located and
operated at The National Institute for Computational Sciences in Oak Ridge National Lab,
Tennessee, US.
Athena, Cray XT4 supercomputer is dedicated for climate, weather and quantum chromodynamics research. With 18,048 cores, 4,512 compute nodes, two AMD Opteron 2.3 GHz
quad-core processors at each node and 18 terabytes of memory, it can reach a peak
performance of 166 teraflop (Baer, 2010). Jaguar and Jaguar PF are used for the internal
differentiation of Cray XT4 and Cray XT5 machines, respectively. Cray XT5 has a peak
performance of 1.38 petaflop, while Cray XT4 has 0.26 petaflop. Both these put together
have a system memory of 362 TB and 45,208 quad-core Opteron processors. SeaStar2+
3D torus connects the compute nodes (Bland, Kendall, Kothe, Rogers, & Shipman, 2009).
Kraken is Cray XT5 supercomputer with a peak performance of 1.17 petaflop, 147 TB of
compute memory and 9,408 compute nodes, it is the most powerful supercomputer used
for academic purposes. SeaStar2+ router connects the compute nodes that have two 2.6
GHz hex-core processors (NICS, 2014).
1.3

Maintenance Records of the Supercomputers

The main data in the work are the maintenance records of the four supercomputers, Athena,
Jaguar, Jaguar PF and, Kraken. The data was collected for the period from October 2009
to December 2010. These records include both emergency maintenance and preventive
maintenance. Emergency maintenance is a maintenance activity performed immediately
after a system’s failure with an intention to fix the problem and restore it to its normal
operating mode. Preventive maintenance is a maintenance activity that is usually
performed at regular pre-determined intervals with an intention to identify and reduce
incipient failures that can potentially cause a system failure at a later stage, thus reducing
the occurrence of actual failures. The maintenance policy for the four supercomputers calls
for immediate emergency maintenance after every failure and preventive maintenance at
regular interval of two weeks. It can be noted from the maintenance records that the
preventive maintenance was not performed at a fixed interval for any of the four
supercomputers, probably due to some practical restrictions. It may be due to the fact that
the supercomputer is not intentionally interrupted while performing a job.
Each maintenance performed is entered into the event log system manually and includes:
 Downtime: it is the date and time at which the system’s normal functioning is
interrupted due to either the emergency maintenance or the preventive maintenance.
This is also called as Incident Start Time.
 Uptime: it is the date and time at which the system is brought back to its normal
functioning after either the emergency maintenance or the preventive maintenance.
This is also called as Incident End Time.
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Type of the interrupt: it indicates if the interruption is due to emergency
maintenance or preventive maintenance.
The raw maintenance records obtained for each supercomputer are refined by eliminating
any redundancies. Table 1 shows the number of emergency and preventive maintenance
records after refining the raw data for each supercomputer, over the recorded period.

Table 1: Number of maintenance records for each supercomputer
Supercomputer
Maintenance Type
Athena Jaguar Jaguar PF Kraken
Emergency
35
58
130
53
Preventive
7
30
39
23
Total
42
88
169
76

1.4

Methodology

A system that can be restored to satisfactory performance after failing to perform one or
more of its intended functions satisfactorily by employing a method other than replacing
the entire system is called a repairable system (Ascher & Feingold, 1984). This is the most
commonly used definition of a repairable system. A supercomputer is a combination of
several clusters, with each cluster having several modules. Each module has its own failure
characteristic and can fail independently, causing a system failure. Each cluster can be
repaired independently and is done by repair or replacement of its module(s). The
maintenance records available do not contain any information at a module level but are at
a system level. Thus, the maintenance records can be considered as a superimposition of
interruptions at module level. Therefore, the analysis of maintenance records is done
considering the failure of the system as a whole. Each of the four supercomputers is
considered to be a complex repairable system as they can be restored to satisfactory
performance after each interruption.
We have a situation where each time there is an interruption of a supercomputer, a
maintenance activity returns it to a satisfactory operating condition, creating an interruptmaintenance-interrupt-maintenance cycle. The interruption can be due to the emergency
maintenance or the preventive maintenance. In order to estimate a supercomputer
performance measures, it is required to understand the interrupt characteristics and the
maintenance characteristics. Interrupt characteristics can be understood by modelling the
maintenance records using a statistical model that best fits the time to interrupts of a
supercomputer. Maintenance characteristics can be understood by modelling the repair
time using a probability life distribution model.
Chapter 2 presents the literature review done on supercomputers in order to gain
understanding of analysis approaches used to analyze failure data of supercomputers. It
also presents the literature review done on repairable systems in general to understand the
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evolution of statistical models used to model their failure data. It has been established that
general proportional intensity model (GPIM) can be used to model the maintenance records
of supercomputers. This model has the provision to model both emergency and preventive
maintenance together and also considers their effectiveness of system restoration. GPIM is
used to model the interruption process of each of the four supercomputers separately.
Probability life distributions are used to model the repair times of the maintenance activities
of each of the four supercomputers separately. The results of these two models are used to
estimate the availability of each of the four supercomputers. All these results are used to
review the existing maintenance policy and propose new maintenance policy if there is a
scope for improvement.
1.5

Purpose of the Thesis

The purpose of this thesis is to analyze the maintenance records of each of the four
supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken to understand their dependability.
Dependability of a supercomputer is a function of its reliability, availability and
maintainability.
The real time maintenance data of the four supercomputers is used to obtain the below
outcomes, for each of it.
 Statistically model the process of occurrence of maintenance interrupts
 Estimate the reliability and maintainability parameters
 Model the repair time to fit life probability distributions
 Calculate the achieved availability during the observed period and estimate the
predicted availability
 Comment on the existing maintenance policy and propose an improved
maintenance policy
1.6

Organization of the Thesis

The remainder of the thesis is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents the literature review
on the basic reliability and availability models and those related to the reliability of high
performance computing. Chapter 3 presents GPIM and the approach followed to obtain the
reliability and maintainability parameters of each supercomputer, along with the results for
each supercomputer. Chapter 4 presents the repair time analysis and the basic statistics of
the repair times of each supercomputer. The analysis is conducted for the repair times of
only the emergency maintenance, only the preventive maintenance, and both emergency
and preventive maintenances. Chapter 5 presents the system availability measures for each
supercomputer along with comments on existing maintenance policy and proposes a new
maintenance policy. Chapter 6 summarizes the work done in this thesis and discusses future
scope.
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2

LITERATURE REVIEW

This chapter is divided into four sections. Section 2.1 focuses on the literature review of
failure analysis done on high performance computing systems. Section 2.2 focuses on the
literature review of repairable systems and the approach used to analyze their failure
occurrences. Section 2.4 summarizes the findings of the literature review that are
applicable to this thesis. Finally, Section 2.4 explains how the work done in this thesis is
different from the other publications.
2.1

Failure Analysis on Supercomputers

Supercomputers are computing systems with the highest capability that can handle the
computational needs in a given period of time. The evolution of supercomputers, propelled
by the discoveries made in materials and manufacturing over the past 40 years, is
noteworthy and they have seen a 10-fold increase in the performance, every 4 years. Their
computational performance has been improved with changes in architecture, software,
applications, etc., the latest being massive parallel processing and cluster systems that
integrate large number of components (Riganati, 1984; Scheneck, 1990; Xie, Fang, Hu, &
Wu, 2010; Yang, Liao, & Song, 2011). The failures on any component, be it hardware,
software, input/output systems or interconnect system can hinder its normal functioning.
A proper repair action has to be performed to get it back to its normal operational mode. It
is required to understand the failure pattern to make important organizational decisions
such as maintenance policy to be followed, inventory requirements, etc.
The body of literature on supercomputer shows that there is a lot of focus on the
supercomputer architecture and ways to improve its computing performance. The primary
interest is to study the part of literature that specifically focuses on the work done on failure
analysis of supercomputers, aiming at understanding its performance and suggesting ways
to improve its maintenance. It is observed that failure analysis has been done on high
performance computing systems operational in both laboratory and commercial setups.
The work varied depending on the type of data collected and the focus of the study.
Two publications focused on the causes of failure and presented the basic statistical data.
One publication studied Tandem supercomputer over a period of 3 years and presented the
basic statistical data comparing its failure causes. The failure causes are categorized as
environmental, human related, interconnect, software and hardware. It also presented the
data showing that the reliability of the hardware component of the system is improved by
proper maintenance plan (Gray, 1990). The other publication characterized the causes of
machine reboot of Windows NT, the network system in a commercial environment. The
observations show that most of the reboots are caused by software. It is also shown that
rebooting does not solve the problem but only contributes to the machine downtime
(Kalyanakrishnam, Kalbarczyk, & Iyer, 1999). There is one publication that focuses on
understanding the correlation of failures with factors external to the system. Failure
analysis of a large scale server environment, holding up to 400 servers show that system
errors exhibit a time varying behavior with periodic patterns. It has been shown that the
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failure rates have a strong correlation with workload and the number of hours of operation
in a day. (Sahoo, Squillante, Sivasubramaniam, & Zhang, 2004).
Two publications focused on time between failures, repair times, and rate of failure. These
publications used probability life distributions to fit the time between failures, and repair
times and used the probability density function to estimate the rate of failure. It is shown
that Weibull distribution and exponential distributions are a good fit for the time to failures.
Failure analysis of internet service interruptions on a collection of interconnected
computers treated as a high performance computing system shows that time between
failures is modelled by a Weibull distribution with shaper parameter less than 1, showing
a decreasing failure rate (Heath, 2002). 23000 failures records of about 20 different large
computing clusters are analyzed and life distributions are fitted to the time between
failures, and the repair times. Weibull distribution with shape parameters ranging from 0.7
to 0.8 are fitted for the time between failures, and lognormal distributions are fitted for the
repair times. It is reported that the failures show decreasing hazard rate and repair times
vary a lot across different clusters (Schroeder & Gibson, 2010).
Three publications have focused on understanding the availability of high performance
computing clusters. One publication studies two DEC VAX cluster multicomputer systems
and established that there are correlated failures caused due to shared resources. It is shown
that about 40% of failures occurs in bursts. The failure data is used to model the availability
of system based on K out of n systems approach (Tang, Iyer, & Subramani, 1990). The
other publication studied the individual server failures to understand failure propagation
between 503 servers of Networked Windows NT system, in a commercial environment. It
was observed that software and hardware failures are the major contributors and the
average availability of individual server is over 99% (Xu, Kalbarcyzyk, & Iyer, 1999). The
third publication studied real time event logs from a 512 node clusters in Lawrence
Livermore National Laboratory. A single framework that coordinates event monitoring,
filtering, data analysis and dynamic availability modeling is presented based on the Markov
chain models (Song, Chokchai, Nassar, Gottumukkala, & Scott, 2006).
To the best of our search, we did not find any publication with a focus on analyzing the
maintenance records of supercomputers that takes into account both emergency
maintenance and preventive maintenance. Also, we did not find any publication that
focuses on optimally scheduling the preventive maintenance interval of a supercomputer.
In this regard, it is important to review the literature on modelling approaches to model the
failure data of a repairable system to see if there exists a model that can be used for the
maintenance records of the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken.
2.2

Failure Analysis of Repairable Systems

This section presents different models used in literature to model the failure data of a
repairable system and discusses the suitability of them to model the maintenance records
of the four supercomputers.

7
2.2.1 Component failure analysis
In the context of this thesis, a component is anything that once failed, the cost of repair is
almost equal to cost of the component and so it is better to replace rather than repair it,
after a failure. Thus, for a component, the failure analysis is based on the time to first
failure. To model the reliability of a component, one needs to fit an appropriate probability
life distribution to the time to first failures of all the components tested. Fitting probability
distributions requires selecting a probability model that best fits the failure data, from a list
of models that are generally used in reliability analysis (Barlow & Proschan, 1975;
ReliaSoft). Proper model selection criteria is to be used to select the best model and one
needs a good understanding on various facets of multi-model selection (Akaike, 1974;
Schwarz, 1978; Burnham & Anderson, 2004; Quesenberry & Kent, 1982; Ye, Meyer, &
Neuman, 2008). Once the probable model is selected, the parameters that best fit the failure
data are estimated (Basu, 1964; Scholz, 2004).
The approach is used to fit the life distributions to the time between failures of
supercomputers in some publications (Heath, 2002; Schroeder & Gibson, 2010) but it is
not appropriate. This approach is only suitable to model the time to first failures as they
can be treated as independent and identically distributed (IID). Life distributions are not
appropriate to model the time between failures (interrupts) of a supercomputer (a repairable
system) as they are neither independent nor identically distributed but can be used to model
the repair times of the supercomputers as repair times form a series of random variables
that are IID.
2.2.2 Repairable system analysis
The time between failures of a repairable system are not IID and so a repairable system has
to be modelled by a process rather than a distribution (ReliaSoft). Literature on repairable
systems is primarily focused on modeling failure occurrences using counting theory or
point process theory.
Duane model is the earliest model that accounts for the changes in failure rates over the
system life (Duane, 1964). AMSAA model proposes a more accurate model to fit the
occurrence of failures of a repairable system and is based on stochastic point process (Crow
L. H., 1984). It defines the intensity of the failures observed in a repairable system as the
rate of change of expected number of failures with respect to time. Figure 1 shows
geometric representation of the failures modelled by stochastic point process. 𝑇1 , 𝑇2 , 𝑇3 ,
… represent the time of occurrence of failures and 𝑋1, 𝑋2, 𝑋3 , … represent the time
between failures. A lot of publications focus their study in this area and various other
models have been proposed. The summary of about fifteen distinct growth models is
provided in The Military Handbook: Reliability Growth Management (Department of
Defense, 1981). NHPP based on power law model is the most popular process in literature
used to obtain the failure intensity function of a repairable system as it can model both
varying and constant failure intensity (ReliaSoft; Park & Pickering, 1997).
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Figure 1: Geometric interpretation of failures modelled by stochastic point process

2.2.3 As good as new maintenance models
When a maintenance activity restores the repairable system such that it is brought back to
as good as new (AGAN) condition, in which it is just as it was first operated, then it is
called a perfect maintenance. In this case, the time between failures of the system form
random variables that are IID and the failure process is said to follow a renewal process
(Taylor & Karlin, 1994). Figure 2 shows the graph of failure intensity vs time for a system
modelled by ASAN maintenance model.

Figure 2: Failure intensity for AGAN model
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The linear baseline intensity is used for illustration purpose. It can be seen that the failure
intensity is reset to zero by each maintenance action performed after a failure has occurred.
ASAN model is a bad model for complex repairable systems as any maintenance will only
fix a part of the system to restore it to a satisfactory performance but does not repair
majority of other components. Predominant presence of aged components means that the
system is not renewed with respect to its reliability aspects. Thus, this model is ruled out
to model the maintenance records of the four supercomputers.
2.2.4 As good as old maintenance models
When a maintenance activity restores the system such that it is brought back to as good as
old (AGAO) condition, in which it is just as it was immediately before the occurrence of
failure, then it is called minimal maintenance. In this case, the time between failures of the
system form random variables that are not IID and the failure process is modelled by Non
homogeneous Poisson process (NHPP). If the rate of occurrence of interrupts is constant
over time, i.e., constant failure intensity, it is a special case of NHPP that follows
homogeneous Poisson process (HPP) (Crow, 1975). Reliability trend tests are used to
statistically verify if the failure intensity is constant, increasing, or decreasing (Coit, 2005;
Kvaloy & Lindqvist, 1998). Figure 3 shows the graph of failure intensity vs time for a
system modelled by AGAO model with linear baseline intensity used for illustration
purpose.

Figure 3: Failure intensity for AGAO model

It can be seen that there is no change in the failure intensity after each maintenance
followed by occurrence of a failure. AGAO model, also called as NHPP model is a poor
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model for systems with very few components for which the intensity function usually
changes following maintenance but it can be considered for systems with large number of
components. Thus, for the supercomputers this model cannot be ruled out but it may not
be a practical case always as it considers only one possible case of restoration. Also, one
has to treat both the emergency and preventive maintenance in the same way to use this
model.
2.2.5 Models considering maintenance effectiveness
AGAN and AGAO are only two possibilities that a repairable system can be restored to.
AGAN is an extreme case and is the best possible state of restoration. A more practical
case may be that after the maintenance, the system is restored to a condition which is worse
than new and better than the condition at which it has failed. Brown and Proschan proposed
an imperfect repair model in which it is considered that a maintenance restores the system
to AGAN with probability 𝑝 and AGAO with probability (1 − 𝑝) (Brown & Proschan,
1983). Chan and Shaw (Chan & Shaw, 1993) model and the quasi renewal model (Jack,
1998) are two other models which are on the similar lines. However, these models still
consider that all the maintenance activities restore a system to either AGAN or AGAO,
thus creating a need for other models that can consider the general effect of maintenance
on the system’s performance. A maintenance can affect a system in a way that it reduces
the system’s failure intensity where it actually fixes the problem, or in a way that it
increases the system’s failure intensity, cases where it may induce new defects, such as in
photocopiers.
The literature contains many models that can accommodate different effects of
maintenance on system’s performance. This section covers the prominent models. The age
reduction Kijima Type I and Type II models (Kijima, 1989) and proportional intensity
model (PIM) (Cox, 1972; Percy, Kobbacy, & Ascher, 1998) are the most commonly used
models to model a repairable system under imperfect maintenance. Both these models
contain NHPP as the baseline model. Age reduction model modifies the intensity function
considering a virtual age to which a system is reset to after maintenance. The virtual age is
a fraction of the actual age whose magnitude is decided by the effectiveness of
maintenance. This does not modify the baseline intensity. The PIM modifies the baseline
intensity function after each maintenance by a multiplicative or an additive factor whose
magnitude depends on the effectiveness of maintenance. Doyen and Gaudoin (Doyen &
Gaudoin, 2004) proposed models with failure intensity improvement factor after each
repair and is based on two approaches, arithmetic reduction, and geometric reduction.
Multiplicative scaling of the intensity function after maintenance is a more recent proposed
model and better fits the physical situation of a repairable system that is improving,
deteriorating or constant with time (David F.P. & Babakalli, 2006). Figure 4 shows the
graph of failure intensity for age reduction model with linear baseline intensity used for
illustration purpose.
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Figure 4: Failure intensity for age reduction model

The limitation to these models is that they are designed to model only emergency
maintenance (followed by an actual failures) but the supercomputers have emergency as
well as preventive maintenance. Thus, other models that can accommodate preventive
maintenance are considered.
2.2.6 Generalized maintenance models
Generalized age reduction model (GARM) and Generalized proportional intensity model
(GPIM) consider effect of maintenance on system’s performance and have the provision
for modelling both the emergency and preventive maintenance together. These models are
introduced during the past five years and indicate the increase in awareness of inclusion of
preventive maintenance in the maintenance protocol of industries.
GARM (Arwa, Soufiane, & Mounir, 2013) is an extension of the age reduction model and
GPIM (Percy & Babakalli, 2006) is an extension of the PIM model. Though GARM is a
good statistical model and fits the maintenance data well, it is more of a theoretical model
than a model that considers the true nature of the repairable system. GPIM provides a more
practical physical model and has a higher potential for maintenance decision making than
GARM with the possibility to accommodate future extensions to this study, such as
including predictor variables and covariates. GARM is generally used for systems
following a block replacement policy and can be a good statistical model but has a
limitation that it does not provide a practical description of the failure process. Replacing
a failed timing belt of a car does not reduce the age of the car as all the other components
are not any less likely to fail. GPIM is finding an increased attention in the literature and
has been applied to maintenance modelling in oil and gas industry (David & Babakalli,
2007) , gas turbines (Babakalli, 2012) and power transmission sector (Amin, Mahmood, &
Mohsen, 2014). This provides a better description of the actual physical situation of the
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system as it modifies the failure intensity function after every maintenance activity based
on the effectiveness of the maintenance.
2.3

Summary

To the best of our knowledge, the literature review shows that there is no publication that
analyzes the maintenance records of supercomputers that contain both emergency
maintenance and preventive maintenance.
The literature review shows that the below points can be considered to model the
maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers.
 The process of occurrence of interrupts follows stochastic point process.
 GPIM is the best model that fits the maintenance records as it has the provision to
model the emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance together and it also has
factors representing the effectiveness of these two maintenance actions.
 NHPP with power law intensity can be used as the baseline failure intensity for the
GPIM.
Thus, GPIM forms the main model for the failure analysis of the four supercomputers.
Chapter 3 explains the approach taken to estimate the reliability and maintainability
parameters using the GPIM and presents the results for the four supercomputers.
2.4

Uniqueness of this Thesis

To the best of our knowledge, an exhaustive literature search on failure analysis of
supercomputers has shown that this thesis is different from the others publications in below
ways:
 It considers the real time maintenance records of four supercomputers in a
laboratory environment, spanning over a period of about one year, rather than a
single system analysis done in most other publications.
 The four supercomputers are complex repairable systems involving large number
of hardware and software components and are maintained by emergency as well as
preventive maintenance, thus requiring a model with higher complexity. It is not a
case of simple component replacement that can be modelled by AGAN or a simple
repairable system that can be modelled by AGAO model.
 It adopts the GPIM to model the maintenance records of the supercomputers as it
can capture the reliability parameters and effectiveness of maintenance for both
emergency and preventive maintenance. GPIM is used for the first time to model
maintenance data of high performance computing systems.
 It models the maintenance times using life distributions and uses the results in
combination with the GPIM results to estimate the achieved and predicted
availability of each of the four supercomputers. The results are also used to
comment on the effectiveness of the existing maintenance policy and to propose
an improved maintenance policy.
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3

GENERAL PROPORTIONAL INTENSITY MODEL

This chapter fits the GPIM to the maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers.
Section 3.1 presents the GPIM and the analysis approach followed to estimate its reliability
and maintainability parameters. Section 3.2 presents a statistical test to determine the trend
of interrupts. Section 3.3 presents the GPIM parameter values and the trend test results. It
also comments on the system’s performance and effectiveness of maintenance actions for
each supercomputer. Section 3.4 summarizes the observations made in this chapter.
3.1

GPIM and Methodology

The interrupt-maintenance-interrupt-maintenance cycle observed on the supercomputer
cannot be modelled by a probability life distribution as it is usually applicable to model the
time to first failure. Moreover, the time between successive interrupts of a supercomputer
may not be independent and identically distributed. Thus, a stochastic point process that
models the occurrence of interrupts is appropriate for modelling this situation (Ascher &
Feingold, 1984). This model considers time to interrupts rather than time between
interrupts. Figure 6 presents a schematic representation of the interrupt-maintenance
process of the supercomputers. At any given point of time the supercomputer either of the
two states, normal operating mode or under maintenance. The maintenance records of each
of the four supercomputers start and end with the occurrence of an interrupt, either
emergency or preventive.

Figure 5: Schematic representation of the supercomputer interrupt-maintenance process
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This chapter is focused on the failure intensity of the supercomputer which is dependent
on the time to interrupts. It is assumed that the interruption process is independent of the
maintenance time at each interrupt and thus maintenance times are negligible compared to
the time to interrupts. Thus, this chapter deals only with the normal operating state of the
supercomputer along with the occurrence of the interrupts. The supercomputer
maintenance state and the maintenance times analysis is dealt with in Chapter 4. Figure 6
presents a schematic representation of the interrupt-maintenance process of the
supercomputers considered in this chapter.

Figure 6: Schematic representation of the supercomputer interrupt process
Let 𝑇1 , 𝑇2 , 𝑇3 , … represent the time to successive interrupts of the supercomputer. These
times are the supercomputer operating times. Let 𝑇𝑘 be the random variable representing
the total operating time of the system since it initially started until the kth interrupt. For this
analysis, it is assumed that the initial start point for each supercomputer is the point at
which it resumes normal functioning, after fixing the first recorded interrupt. Thus, the
operating time at the initial start point is zero. 𝑇𝑛 represents the operating time of the
supercomputer at the last recorded interrupt. Let 𝑋1 , 𝑋2 , 𝑋3, … represent the successive
time between interrupts of the supercomputer. Let 𝑋𝑘 be the random variable representing
the system operating time between interrupt (𝑘 − 1) and interrupt 𝑘. 𝑇𝑘 and 𝑋𝑘 are related
by the below two equations.

X k  Tk  Tk 1
k

Tk   X k

(1)
(2)

i 0

Let 𝑍(𝑡) be the counting function and represents the number of interrupts (both emergency
and preventive) that occur during the interval (0, 𝑡], for all 𝑡 > 0 (Leemis, 1995). It is of
primary interest to understand the behavior of the interruption process and is described by
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the failure intensity function, 𝜌(𝑡) which is the rate of change of expected number of
interrupts with respect to time given by,

 t  

d
EZ t 
dt

(3)

and is also called as rate of occurrence of interrupts. Figure 7 shows the notation of interrupt
pattern and geometric representation of the counting and the intensity function for the
supercomputers.

Figure 7: Geometric interpretation of stochastic point process for the supercomputers

The failure intensity function of a GPIM is (Percy & Babakalli, 2006) ,

 N t  M t  
 t   0 t  si  rj 
 i1  j 1 

(4)

where 𝑠𝑖 (𝑟𝑗 ) is the intensity scaling factor for each emergency (preventive) maintenance
and 𝑁(𝑡)(𝑀(𝑡)) is the total number of emergency (preventive) maintenance activities
performed on the supercomputer during the interval (0, 𝑡], 𝜌0 (𝑡) is the baseline intensity
function of the supercomputer and 𝑠𝑖 and 𝑟𝑗 are positive real numbers for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,…
𝑁(𝑡) and for 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑀(𝑡), respectively.
The baseline intensity function can take many forms but the appropriate function is the one
that corresponds to the hazard rate function of a familiar life distribution. This goes with
the reason that for the time to first interrupt of a supercomputer, the intensity function and
the hazard rate function are identical. Thus, the intensity function can be a constant
intensity, log linear intensity or a power-law intensity corresponding to an exponential
hazard, Gumbel hazard and, Weibull hazard, respectively. The most commonly used model
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in the literature for a complex repairable systems is the power-law intensity (Crow L. H.,
1975; Huairui & Wenbiao, 2006) as it is flexible and can model increasing, decreasing and,
constant failure rates. Thus, the time to first interrupt of each of the four supercomputers is
assumed to have a Weibull distribution and the corresponding failure intensity function
defined by power-law is

0 t    t  1

(5)

where 𝜆 is the scale parameter and 𝛽 is the shape parameter corresponding to the Weibull
hazard.
𝜆 and 𝛽 indicate the reliability parameters of the supercomputer and take positive real
values. Particularly,
 𝛽 lies in the interval (0,1) if the rate of occurrence of interrupts is decreasing, indicating
that the supercomputer is improving such as experiencing infant mortality phase of the
reliability bathtub curve;
 𝛽 is greater than one, if the rate of occurrence of interrupts is increasing, indicating that
the supercomputer is deteriorating such as experiencing wear out phase of the reliability
bathtub curve; and
 𝛽 is equal to one, if the rate of occurrence of interrupts remains constant, indicating
that the supercomputer is stable.
The intensity scaling factors can take the form of random variables varying with interrupts
or varying with operation time or simply positive constants. For the purpose of this thesis,
a reasonable assumption for the preliminary analysis can be that the scaling factors take
the form of constants, i.e., 𝑠𝑖 = 𝑠 for 𝑖 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑁(𝑡) and 𝑟𝑗 = 𝑟 for 𝑗 = 1, 2, 3,… 𝑀(𝑡).
Substituting these values and the base line intensity function given by Equation (5) in
Equation (4), the intensity function modelled by GPIM is

 t    t  1 s N (t ) r M (t )

(6)

where 𝑠 and 𝑟 are the intensity scaling factor of emergency and preventive maintenance,
respectively. They indicate the maintainability parameters of the supercomputer and take
positive real values. Particularly,
 𝑠 and 𝑟 lie in the interval (0,1) if the failure intensity reduces after each maintenance
action indicating that the maintenance has a positive effect on the performance of the
supercomputer;
 𝑠 and 𝑟 are greater than one, if the failure intensity increases after each maintenance
action indicating that the maintenance has a negative effect on the performance of the
supercomputer; and
 𝑠 and 𝑟 are equal to one, if the failure intensity does not change after a maintenance
action indicating that the maintenance does not change the performance of the
supercomputer. This is a special case of GPIM where the maintenance restores the
supercomputer to AGAO situation and is modelled by NHPP.
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GPIM is used to fit the maintenance records for each of the four supercomputers, namely,
Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken. The next two sections elaborate on the method used
to estimate the parameters of the GPIM model.
3.1.1 Maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
Now that the GPIM model is used and the failure intensity function is defined, the next
step is to estimate the reliability and maintainability parameters. The values of the
parameters have to be such that the intensity function with these parameter values should
be the closest statistical model that can replicate the interruption process of each of the four
supercomputers. The two general methods used for parameter estimation are least-square
estimation and MLE. The latter is the most common method used for wide range of
applications. MLE of a parameter is that value of the unknown parameter that results in the
highest probability of obtaining the observed data.
𝑇1 , 𝑇2 , 𝑇3 , …, 𝑇𝑛 are the successive time to interrupts and form a random sample obtained
from a distribution that depends on four unknown parameters 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟 with a
probability density function 𝑓(𝑇𝑘 |λ, β, s, r ). The joint probability density function of 𝑇1 ,
𝑇2 , 𝑇3 , …, 𝑇𝑛 is called the likelihood function,

L,  , s, r | Qt   f T1 , T2 , T3 ,..., Tn | ,  , s, r 

(7)

where 𝑄(𝑡) represents the observed maintenance records. Equation (7) is read as likelihood
of the parameters 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟 given the maintenance records of the supercomputer is
equal to the likelihood or probability of observing the given data as a function of these
parameters. The MLE of the four parameters are the values of these parameters that
maximize the likelihood function. The likelihood function considering that preventive
maintenance as a right censored data is

 Tn
 Z (t )
c
L ,  , s, r | Qt   exp     (t )dt   Tk |  ,  , s, r  k

 k 1
 0


(8)

where 𝑍(𝑡) = 𝑀(𝑇) + 𝑁(𝑇) and 𝑐𝑘 is the censor indicator. 𝑐𝑘 = 1 for emergency
maintenance and 𝑐𝑘 = 0 for preventive maintenance.
Maximizing the product can get quite tedious and hence we maximize the log likelihood,
an equivalent of likelihood due to the fact that logarithm is an increasing function. From
Equation (8), the log likelihood function is given by
Z t 

l ,  , s, r | Qt    c k ln   ln     1 ln t k  N t  ln s  M t  ln r
i 1

Z t 



  s N tk  r M tk  t k  t k1
k 1



(9)
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3.1.2 Optimizing the log-likelihood
GPIM can get complex, especially if it is required to fit about 50 to 100 maintenance
records. Thus, MATLAB is used to find the parameters that optimize the log-likelihood
function of GPIM. MATLAB is a short form of matrix laboratory which is an interactive
numerical computing environment using fourth-generation programming language. It is
developed by Math Works and allows various matrix computations, plotting of functions,
algorithm implementation and can interface with programs written in different languages.
We used 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛, a predefined function in the optimization toolbox of MATLAB to find
the reliability and maintainability parameters that optimize the nonlinear log-likelihood
function given by Equation (9), to fit the maintenance records of each of the four
supercomputers. 𝑓𝑚𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑜𝑛 minimizes the intensity function and takes into consideration
the constraints on the variables or parameters and is generally called constrained nonlinear
optimization function. Thus to maximize the log-likelihood function the negative loglikelihood function is taken. It optimizes based on the four optimization algorithms, trustregion-reflective algorithm, active set algorithm, interior-point algorithm, and sequential
quadratic programming algorithm. The constraints considered while maximizing the loglikelihood of the GPIM are that each of four parameters, 𝜆, 𝛽, 𝑠, and 𝑟 are positive.
3.2

Time Trend Test

A time trend test is can statistically determine the type of trend exhibited by the interrupt
times. The trend can be decreasing, indicating that the supercomputer is exhibiting an
improving behavior, or increasing, indicating that the supercomputer is exhibiting a
deteriorating performance. If there is no trend then the system is stable and the process
becomes HPP, a special case of NHPP. In this thesis we use Laplace trend test to check
whether the interrupts of each of the four supercomputers exhibit a trend.
The hypothesis of the Laplace trend test is given as:
Null hypothesis:
𝐻𝑜 is that the supercomputer does not exhibit any time trend that is
the supercomputer is stable.
Alternate hypothesis: 𝐻𝑎 is that the supercomputer exhibits a time trend that is the
supercomputer is either improving or deteriorating.
Laplace trend test is defined for both Type I and Type II data. If the data recording is
terminated at a predetermined time, then the maintenance record of that supercomputer is
said to be Type I censored. If the data recording is terminated at a point of occurrence of
an interrupt, then the supercomputer is said to be Type II censored. The maintenance
records of the four supercomputers are terminated at the occurrence of an interrupt, rather
than at a predetermined time, thus all the four supercomputers are considered to be Type
II censored.
The Laplace test statistic for Type II censored data is
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where 𝑛 is the total number of interrupts considering both emergency and preventive
maintenance. The null hypothesis, 𝐻𝑜 is rejected if 𝑈 is out of the range [𝑍𝛼 , 𝑍1−𝛼 ] where
k 1



2

2

𝛼 is the significance level of the hypothesis test and 𝑍 is the value at specified 𝛼 taken from
standard normal distribution table. 𝛼 is related to confidence limit of the hypothesis test by
the equation, 𝛼 = 1 − (𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑙𝑖𝑚𝑖𝑡/100). At 5% level of significance, 𝛼 = 0.05
and [𝑍0.025 , 𝑍0.975 ] = [−1.96,1.96].
If the null hypothesis is rejected and there is enough evidence to accept that there is a trend
in the interrupt process, it is of interest to know if the supercomputer has an increasing
trend or a decreasing trend. Specifically,
 𝑈 < 0 if there is a decreasing trend that is the interrupts are becoming less likely
and the interval between interrupts are getting larger indicating that the
supercomputer is improving.
 𝑈 > 0 if there is an increasing trend that is the interrupts are becoming more likely
and the interval between interrupts are getting smaller indicating that the
supercomputer is deteriorating.
3.3

Results

The log-likelihood function presented by Equation (9) is used to fit the maintenance records
of each of the four supercomputers. The MLE of the reliability parameters, scale
parameter, 𝜆, and shape parameter 𝛽, corresponding to the Weibull distribution
corresponding of the baseline intensity function are estimated. The maintainability
parameters, 𝑠 and, 𝑟 representing the scaling factors of the emergency and preventive
maintenance, respectively are estimated.
Table 2 presents the estimates of the four parameters along with the maximum value of the
log-likelihood function for each of the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF,
and Kraken. Table 3 presents the Laplace trend test results for each of the four
supercomputers. The rest of this section presents the observations on each supercomputer
based on the reliability and maintenance parameters shown in Table 2 and the trend test
results shown in Table 3.
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Table 2: GPIM model parameter estimates
Supercomputer
log likelihood
𝑠̂
𝑟̂
𝜆̂
𝛽̂
Athena
0.0026 1.0415 0.9467 1.6231
-228.0823
Jaguar
0.0350 0.7500 1.0882 0.8097
-356.3360
Jaguar PF
0.0025 1.2063 1.0134 0.9965
-686.8591
Kraken
0.0048 1.0814 1.0251 0.9585
-333.3181

Table 3: Laplace trend test results
5% significance
𝑈
Supercomputer
[-1.96, 1.96]
-0.0821
Athena
Stationary
-2.0388
Jaguar
Improving
Jaguar PF
2.5000
Deteriorating
Kraken
-0.2131
Stationary

3.3.1 Athena
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Athena show that
 the shape parameter, 𝛽̂ is almost equal to one and thus, Athena exhibits a constant
failure intensity and is stationary. This is also confirmed by the Laplace trend test;
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, 𝑠̂ is 0.9467, which is less than one. Thus,
each emergency maintenance slightly decreases the failure intensity function and has a
positive effect on Athena’s performance; and
 the preventive maintenance scaling factor, 𝑟̂ is 1.6231, which is higher than one. Thus,
each preventive maintenance prominently increases the failures intensity function and
has a negative effect of Athena’s performance.
Figure 8 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Athena, as modelled
by GPIM. It can be seen that the failure intensity between any two consecutive interrupts
is almost constant but has a sudden change in magnitude at each interrupt, indicating the
effectiveness of the maintenance action. We can see steep increase in failure intensity after
each preventive maintenance action representing its scaling factor of 1.6231 and slight
decrease in failure intensity after each emergency maintenance action representing its
scaling factor of 0.9467. Considering the first ten interrupts,
 Athena has preventive maintenance interrupts at 471, 1109, and 2093 and these points
are marked by steep rise in intensity function; and
 Athena has emergency maintenance interrupts at 626, 632, 771, 881, 1329, 2093, 2226,
and 2617 and these points are marked by slight fall in intensity function.
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Figure 8: Failure intensity of Athena vs time – GPIM

3.3.2 Jaguar
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Jaguar show that
 the shape parameter, 𝛽̂ is 0.75, which is lesser than one. Thus, Jaguar exhibits a
decreasing failure intensity and is improving as the time progresses. This is also
confirmed by the Laplace trend test;
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, 𝑠̂ is 1.0882, which is greater than one. Thus,
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failures intensity function and has a
negative effect of Jaguar’s performance; and
 the preventive scaling factor, 𝑟̂ is 0.8097, which is lesser than one. Thus, each
preventive maintenance prominently decreases the failure intensity function and has a
positive effect on Jaguar’s performance.
Figure 9 shows the change in failure intensity of Jaguar with respect to time, as modelled
by GPIM. It can be seen that the average failure intensity is decreasing with time.
Considering the first ten interrupts,
 Jaguar has preventive maintenance interrupts at 34, 152, 191, and 680 and these points
are marked by steep fall in intensity function due to the scaling factor of 0.8097; and
 Jaguar has emergency maintenance interrupts at 170, 173, 390, 411, 577, and 732 and
these points are marked by slight rise in intensity function due to the scaling factor of
1.0882.
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Figure 9: Failure intensity of Jaguar vs time – GPIM

3.3.3 Jaguar PF
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Jaguar PF show that
 the shape parameter, 𝛽̂ is 1.2063, which is greater than one. Thus, Jaguar PF exhibits
an increasing failure intensity and is deteriorating as the time progresses. This is also
confirmed by the Laplace trend test; and
 the emergency maintenance scaling factor, 𝑠̂ is 1.0134 and preventive scaling factor,
𝑟̂ is 0.9965. Thus, the maintenance actions do not bring in any considerable change in
the failure intensity (performance) of Jaguar PF. This indicates that each maintenance
on Jaguar PF restores it to AGAO.
Figure 10 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Jaguar PF, as
modelled by GPIM. It can be seen that the average failure intensity of Jaguar PF is
increasing with time. It can also be seen that there is almost no sudden change in the failure
intensity at each interrupt, indicating no change in failure intensity after each maintenance.
There seems to be a change in the slope of the curve at about 7200 hours indicating some
major change in the system that caused a faster deterioration of the system. The reason for
this has to be further explored and is not available with the existing maintenance records.
3.3.4 Kraken
The GPIM model fitted to the maintenance records of Kraken show that
 the shape parameter, 𝛽̂ is almost equal to one. Thus, Kraken exhibits a constant failure
intensity and is stationary. This is also confirmed by the Laplace trend test;
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Figure 10: Failure intensity of Jaguar PF vs time - GPIM



the emergency maintenance scaling factor, 𝑠̂ is 1.0251, which is greater than one. Thus,
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failures intensity function and has a
negative effect on Kraken’s performance; and
the preventive maintenance scaling factor, 𝑟̂ is 0.9585, which is lesser than one. Thus,
each preventive maintenance slightly increases the failure intensity function and has a
positive effect on Kraken’s performance.

Figure 11 shows the change in failure intensity with respect to time for Kraken, as modelled
by GPIM. Considering the first ten interrupts,
 Kraken has preventive maintenance interrupts at 862, 1018, and 1540 and these points
are marked by slight fall in intensity function due to scaling factor of 0.9585; and
 Kraken has emergency maintenance interrupts at 64, 121, 320, 466, 958, 1054, and
1728 and these points are marked by slight rise in intensity function due to scaling
factor of 1.0251.
It has to be noted that at about 7200 operating hours, the rate of change of failure intensity
gets steeper indicating that Jaguar PF performance decreases at an increased rate. This may
be explained by the possibility of addition of a hardware component that is not compatible
with the main system.
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3.4

Summary

The maintenance records of each of the four supercomputers are modelled by GPIM and
the trend in occurrence of interrupts is statistically tested by the Laplace trend test. It has
been observed that Athena and Kraken experienced a stationary performance while Jaguar
experienced an improvement in performance and Jaguar PF experiences a deterioration in
performance during the period October 2009 to December 2010.

Figure 11: Failure intensity of Kraken vs time - GPIM

The change in failure intensity for the four supercomputers after each emergency
maintenance is very marginal and can be considered to be negligible for the purpose of this
thesis. Thus, it can be concluded that each emergency maintenance restores the
supercomputers to AGAO state. The results are in acceptance with the fact that emergency
maintenance is only intended to bring back the supercomputer to normal operating
condition by fixing a problem that caused its failure.
It can be observed that the preventive maintenance has varied effects on each of the four
supercomputers showing that either the same maintenance protocol for all the
supercomputers is not an effective solution or that the maintenance protocol followed for
each supercomputer is different. Preventive maintenance has a negative impact on
Athena’s performance as the failure intensity of Athena is prominently increased after each
preventive maintenance. It may be due to the fact that the maintenance personnel are
conducting some performance determination tests during a preventive maintenance that are
inducing additional failures. The failure intensity of Jaguar is prominently decreased after
each preventive maintenance, creating a positive impact on its performance. This may be
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explained by the fact that maintenance personnel could identify the incipient failures and
successfully address them. The change in failure intensity for Jaguar PF and Kraken after
each preventive maintenance is very marginal and can be considered to be negligible for
the purpose of this thesis. This indicates that the preventive maintenance on Jaguar PF and
Kraken could not effectively identify the incipient failures and is serving only as an
inspection done for formality.
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REPAIR TIMES ANALYSIS

This chapter focuses on the analysis of repair times of the four supercomputers. Section
4.1 describes the analysis approach followed in this chapter followed by Section 4.2
providing the criteria for selection of a model from the probability models. Sections 4.3
presents the probability models considered. Sections 4.4 - 4.6 analyze the repair times of
emergency maintenance, preventive maintenance, and both emergency and preventive
maintenance together, respectively, for the four supercomputers. Section 4.7 summarizes
the results obtained in this chapter and presents the observations.
4.1

Analysis Approach

The chapter deals with the maintenance state of the supercomputer and analyzes the
maintenance times. Emergency maintenance is a repair done when there is an interruption
to the normal functioning of the supercomputer due to failure of a component(s), it involves
diagnosing the problem and then fixing it to restore the system to its normal operating
condition. In this case, the repair time can vary a lot depending on the inventory required
to tackle the problem at hand. Preventive maintenance is a pre scheduled maintenance
activity with a fixed protocol and most often than not, the inventory required is procured
before starting the maintenance. In this case, there is a high possibility that the variation of
maintenance time is low. Therefore, it is proposed to model the repair times of emergency
and preventive maintenance separately. JMP Pro software is used to model the probability
life distributions of the repair times for each supercomputer. Figure 12 shows the
schematic representation of the maintenance process of the supercomputer.

Figure 12: Schematic representation of the supercomputer maintenance process

4.2

Model Selection Measures

This section elaborates the measures used for selecting the best probability distribution that
fits the repair times, among the six common distributions considered, exponential, logistic,
log-logistic, lognormal, normal, and, Weibull distributions. Traditionally, log-likelihood
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values are calculated for all the distributions considered and the one with highest loglikelihood value is chosen to be the best distribution that fits the data. But, this method has
a limitation in that the log-likelihood can be increased by adding parameters to a model
i.e., a model with higher number of parameters always has a higher log-likelihood value.
Higher number of parameters in a model may lead to over fitting which is not always good.
There should be a proper balance between fitting the best model, while avoiding the over
fitting.
In order to address the limitation of the log-likelihood measure in selecting the best model
among the considered models we used AICc (Akaike, 1974) and BIC (Schwarz, 1978)
measures introduced by Akaike Hirotugu and Gideon Schwarz, respectively. Both these
measures are based on the log-likelihood value and take the form, 2[−𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 +
𝑝𝑐] where 𝑝 is the number of parameters in the model and 𝑐 is [𝑛/(𝑛 − 𝑝 − 1)] for AICc
and ln 𝑛 for BIC, 𝑛 being the total number of maintenance activities. AICc is a measure of
relative distance between the unknown true likelihood function of the data and the fitted
likelihood function of the model and a model with lower AICc is closer to the truth. BIC
is a measure of the posterior probability of a model being true under a certain Bayesian
setup and a model with lower BIC is more liker to be the true model.
BIC penalizes a complex model more heavily than AICc and the only way they may
disagree is when BIC chooses a smaller model (model with lesser number of parameters)
than AICc. AICc always tends to choose a bigger model (model with higher number of
parameters), regardless of sample size whereas BIC has very little chance of choosing a
bigger model if sample size is just sufficient to fit a model otherwise it usually tends to
select a smaller model. AICc is a better measure in situations where a false negative
selection would be more misleading than a false positive and BIC is a better measure
otherwise (Burnham & Anderson, 2004).
Without loss of generality −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 is used instead of 𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑 whenever
it is used against AICc and BIC to maintain the same sign and make it comparable to AICc
and BIC in terms of magnitude.
4.3

Tested Distributions

Six probability distributions which are widely used to model the reliability data are tested
for their fitness to the repair time data of each supercomputer. The six probability
distributions are: exponential, logistic, log-logistic, lognormal, normal, and, Weibull
distributions. It is observed from our results in this chapter that lognormal and Weibull
distributions always fit the repair time data better than other four distributions. Therefore,
the rest of this section introduces the lognormal and Weibull distributions.
Let 𝑇 be a continuous random variable representing the time to maintenance, be it
emergency or preventive maintenance with a probability density function of ℎ(𝑡), then the
cumulative distribution function, 𝐻(𝑡) is the probability that the maintenance time is less
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than time 𝑡 . Let 𝑀𝑀𝑇 and 𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑑 denote the mean and median of the maintenance times of
the supercomputer.
4.3.1 Weibull distribution
The cumulative density function, 𝐻(𝑡) for Weibull distribution with scale parameter, 𝜆 and
shape parameter, 𝛽 is



H (t )  exp   t 





(11)

The mean, median, standard deviation of time to maintenance of supercomputer, defined
by the Weibull distribution are
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4.3.2 Lognormal distribution
The cumulative density function of failure, 𝐻(𝑡) for lognormal distribution with location
parameter, 𝜇 and shape parameter, 𝜎 is

 log( t )   
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where  nor (z ) represent the cumulative density function of a normal distribution. The
mean, median, standard deviation of time to maintenance of supercomputer, defined by the
lognormal distribution are
 2 
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Once the mean and standard deviation are calculated, the 95% confidence interval 𝐶𝐼0.95
(this is equivalent to 5% 𝛼) for the mean of maintenance times is
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CI 0.95  MMT  Z  

(20)
n
2
𝛼
where 𝑍𝛼 is the value corresponding to 2 in the standard normal distribution table and 𝑛 is
2

the total number of maintenance activities.
4.4

Emergency Maintenance

This section shows the analysis done on the maintenance time distributions of the
emergency maintenance activities. For each of the four supercomputers, the emergency
maintenance records are fitted by the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) and are
compared by three measures, (−2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑), AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections
4.4.1 - 4.4.4 presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF,
and Kraken, respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.
4.4.1 Athena
For Athena, there are 36 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 4 shows the results for
Athena. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Athena with
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution
with 𝜇 = 0.42 and 𝜎 = 1.07 is given by the below equation.

 log( t )  0.42 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

1.07



(21)

The estimate of mean emergency maintenance time (𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇) for Athena is 3.15 hours,
standard deviation is 5.66 and the median is 1.53 hours. This shows that the emergency
maintenance time distribution is heavily skewed towards positive side. The 95%
confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (1.61, 6.84). On an average, it will
take 3.15 hours to perform an emergency maintenance on Athena and there is a huge
variation in the repair times.

Table 4: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Athena
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
143.37
147.75 150.48
Log-logistic
145.67
150.05 152.78
Exponential
150.59
152.71 154.15
Weibull
149.02
153.39 156.13
Logistic
189.05
193.42 196.16
Normal
198.73
203.10 205.84
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4.4.2 Jaguar
For Jaguar, there are 58 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 5 shows the results for
Jaguar. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Jaguar with
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values.
The fitted lognormal distribution with 𝜇 = 1.14 and 𝜎 = 0.76, is

 log( t )  1.14 
Hˆ (t )   nor

0.76



(22)

The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar is 4.17 hours, standard deviation is 3.69 and the median
is 3.12 hours. On an average, it takes 4.17 hours to perform an emergency maintenance on
Jaguar. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (2.90, 5.02).

Table 5: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Jaguar
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
231.25
235.48 239.22
Log-logistic
232.53
236.77 240.51
Weibull
237.46
241.69 245.43
Exponential
250.89
252.97 254.88
Logistic
250.71
254.94 258.69
Normal
264.03
268.26 272.00

4.4.3 Jaguar PF
For Jaguar PF, there are 133 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 6 shows the results for
Jaguar PF. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Jaguar PF
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal
distribution with 𝜇 = 1.12 and 𝜎 = 0.58 is

 log( t )  1.12 
Hˆ (t )   nor

0.58



(23)

The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is 3.62 hours, standard deviation is 2.29 and the
median is 3.06 hours. Thus, it will take 3.62 hours on an average to perform an emergency
maintenance on Jaguar PF. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time
is (3.25, 4.04).
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Table 6: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
491.15
495.25 500.86
Log-logistic
492.89
496.99 502.60
Weibull
522.02
526.12 531.73
Logistic
543.45
547.55 553.15
Normal
568.53
572.63 578.23
Exponential
578.62
580.65 583.47

4.4.4 Kraken
For Kraken, there are 133 emergency maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the emergency maintenance times of Kraken with
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution
with 𝜇 = 0.52 and 𝜎 = 0.96 is

 log( t )  0.52 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

0.96



(24)

The estimate of 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 is 2.67 hours, standard deviation is 3.29 and the median is 1.68
hours. One an average, it takes 2.67 hours on an average to perform an emergency
maintenance on Kraken but there is a huge variation in the repair times. The 95%
confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (1.76, 4.19).

Table 7: Distributions of emergency maintenance repair times for Kraken
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
201.29
205.53 209.24
Log-logistic
204.36
208.60 212.30
Exponential
214.98
217.05 218.95
Weibull
214.97
219.21 222.92
Logistic
265.25
269.49 273.19
Normal
271.33
275.57 279.27

4.5

Preventive Maintenance

This section shows the analysis done on the maintenance time distributions of the
preventive maintenance activities. For the maintenance records of each of the four
supercomputers, the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) are tested and compared
by three measures −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections 4.5.1 - 4.5.4
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presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken,
respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.
4.5.1 Athena
For Kraken, there are 12 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance times of Kraken with
the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution
with 𝜇 = 0.68 and 𝜎 = 0.46 is

 log( t )  0.68 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

0.46



(25)

The estimate of mean preventive maintenance time (𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇) is 2.2 hours, standard
deviation is 1.07 and the median is 1.97 hours. One an average, it takes 2.2 hours to perform
a preventive maintenance activity on Athena. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated
mean repair time is (1.56, 3.21).

Table 8: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Athena
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc BIC
Lognormal
29.19
34.69 33.99
Weibull
30.23
35.73 35.03
Log-logistic
30.32
35.82 35.12
Normal
31.56
37.06 36.36
Logistic
32.52
38.02 37.32
Exponential
39.30
41.75 41.70

4.5.2 Jaguar
For Kraken, there are 31 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of Kraken
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal
distribution with 𝜇 = 1.59 and 𝜎 = 0.47 is

 log( t )  1.59 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

0.47



(26)

The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 5.45 hours, standard deviation 2.69 and the median is 4.89 hours.
On an average, it takes 5.45 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity on Jaguar.
The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (4.42, 6.83).
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Table 9: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Jaguar
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
139.06
143.49 145.93
Log-logistic
139.90
144.33 146.77
Weibull
143.79
148.22 150.66
Logistic
145.38
149.81 152.25
Normal
148.70
153.12 155.56
Exponential
167.16
169.30 170.60

4.5.3 Jaguar PF
For Jaguar PF, there are 42 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc
and BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for
Jaguar PF. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of
Jaguar PF with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values.
The fitted Weibull distribution with 𝜆 = 0.0555 and 𝛽 = 1.1800, is given by





1.1800
Hˆ (t )  1  exp  0.0555t 

(27)

Table 10: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Weibull
260.87
265.18 268.35
Logistic
265.19
269.50 272.67
Normal
266.77
271.08 274.25
Lognormal
267.01
271.32 274.49
Log-logistic
268.55
272.86 276.02
Exponential
279.87
281.97 283.61
The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 10.3 hours, standard deviation is 2.4 and the median is 9.85
hours. On an average, it will take 10.3 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity
on Jaguar PF. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (8.81,
12.21).
4.5.4 Kraken
For Kraken, there are 23 preventive maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and
BIC values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for
Kraken. Lognormal distribution best fits the preventive maintenance repair times of Kraken

34
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal
distribution with 𝜇 = 1.50 and 𝜎 = 0.51 is

 log( t )  1.5 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

 0.51 

(28)

Table 11: Distributions of preventive maintenance repair times for Kraken
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod) AICc
BIC
Lognormal
98.64
103.27 104.82
Log-logistic
99.25
103.88 105.43
Weibull
103.07
107.70 109.25
Logistic
106.63
111.26 112.81
Normal
108.42
113.05 114.60
Exponential
115.98
118.18 119.07
The estimate of 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 is 5.11 hours, standard deviation 2.77 and the median is 4.50 hours.
On an average, it will take 5.11 hours to perform a preventive maintenance activity on
Kraken. The 95% confidence interval of the estimated mean repair time is (3.88, 6.89).
4.6

Emergency and Preventive Maintenance

This section shows the analysis done on the repair time distributions of the both emergency
and preventive maintenance activities considered together. For each data set of a
supercomputer, the six probability distributions (in Section 4.3) are tested and compared
by three measures −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC (in Section 4.2). Sections 4.4.1 - 4.4.4
presents the results for the four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken,
respectively and Section 4.7 summarizes the results.
4.6.1 Athena
For Athena, there are 48 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 4 shows the results for Athena.
Lognormal distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Athena with the
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution with
𝜇 = 0.61 and 𝜎 = 1.20 is

 log( t )  0.61 
Hˆ (t )   nor 

1.20



(29)

The estimate of mean maintenance time (𝑀𝑀𝑇) is 3.80 hours, standard deviation is 6.86
and the median is 1.84 hours. On an average, it will take 3.80 hours to perform maintenance
on Athena and there is a huge variation in the repair times.
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Table 12: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Athena
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod)
AICc
BIC
Lognormal
207.92
212.19 215.62
Log-logistic
209.01
213.28 216.71
Weibull
216.55
220.82 224.25
Exponential
224.40
226.49 228.25
Logistic
287.05
291.32 294.75
Normal
309.79
314.07 317.49

4.6.2 Jaguar
For Jaguar, there are 89 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values
for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 5 shows the results for Jaguar. Weibull
distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Jaguar with the
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted Weibull distribution with 𝜆 =
0.1471 and 𝜆 = 1.2400 is





1.2400
Hˆ (t )  1  exp  0.1471t 

(30)

Table 13: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Jaguar
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod)
AICc
BIC
Weibull
434.39
438.52 443.37
Exponential
440.93
442.97 445.42
Log-logistic
441.45
445.59 450.43
Logistic
455.17
459.31 464.14
Lognormal
472.68
476.81 481.65
Normal
493.93
498.07 502.91
The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 4.69 hours and the standard deviation is 3.55. On an average, it
takes 4.69 hours to perform maintenance on Jaguar.
4.6.3 Jaguar PF
For Jaguar PF, there are 175 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 6 shows the results for Jaguar
PF. Weibull distribution best fits the emergency maintenance repair times of Jaguar PF
with the smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted Weibull distribution
with 𝛼 = 0.1204 and 𝛽 = 1.2200 is
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1.2200
Hˆ (t )  1  exp  0.1204t 

(31)

The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 5.31 hours and the standard deviation is 4.38. Thus, it will take
3.62 hours on an average to perform an emergency maintenance on Jaguar PF.

Table 14: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Jaguar PF
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod)
AICc
BIC
Weibull
869.56
873.63 879.83
Log-logistic
894.30
898.37 904.57
Lognormal
897.71
901.78 907.98
Exponential
905.59
907.61 910.73
Logisitc
985.37
989.44 995.64
Normal
1024.61
1028.68 1034.88

4.6.4 Kraken
For Kraken, there are 76 maintenance actions. The −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC
values for the six tested distributions are calculated. Table 7 shows the results for Kraken.
Lognormal distribution best fits the maintenance repair times of Kraken with the
smallest −2𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑙𝑖𝑘𝑒𝑙𝑖ℎ𝑜𝑜𝑑, AICc and BIC values. The fitted lognormal distribution with
𝜇 = 1.02 and 𝜎 = 0.85 is

 log( t )  1.02 
Hˆ (t )   nor

0.85



(32)

The estimate of 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is 3.96 hours, standard deviation is 4.06 and the median is 4.50
hours. One an average, it takes 3.96 hours on an average to perform a maintenance on
Kraken but there is a huge variation in the repair times.

Table 15: Distributions of all the maintenance repair times for Kraken
Distribution (-2Loglikelihod)
AICc
BIC
Lognormal
347.17
351.33 355.83
Log-logistic
352.37
356.53 361.03
Exponential
364.28
366.33 368.61
Weibull
363.83
368.00 372.50
Logistic
431.11
435.27 439.77
Normal
483.12
487.28 491.78
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4.7

Summary

It is observed that lognormal distribution is the best fit for the emergency maintenance
times, for the four supercomputers. The preventive maintenance times of each of Athena,
Jaguar and Kraken are fitted the best by lognormal distribution, whereas that of Jaguar PF
is fitted by a Weibull distribution. Considering both the emergency and preventive
maintenance actions together, lognormal distribution is the best fit for the maintenance
times of Athena, and Kraken and Weibull distribution is the best fit for the maintenance
times of Jaguar, and Jaguar PF. Table 16 presents the maintenance time distributions and
the estimated mean maintenance time for the four supercomputers.

Table 16: Maintenance (repair) time statistics
Emergency only

Preventive only

Supercomputer Distribution 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 Distribution
Athena
lognormal
3.15
lognormal
Jaguar
lognormal
4.17
lognormal
Jaguar PF
lognormal
3.62
Weibull
Kraken
lognormal
2.67
lognormal

𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇
2.20
5.45
10.30
5.11

Emergency &
Preventive
Distribution 𝑀𝑀𝑇
lognormal
3.80
Weibull
4.38
Weibull
5.31
lognormal
3.96

The observations that can be inferred from the table and the basic statistics presented in
Section 4.4 - 4.6 are:
 The mean emergency maintenance times of each of the four supercomputers are
comparable to each other, whereas the mean preventive maintenance times are very
dissimilar. This may be attributed to the difference in size of each supercomputer
leading to the difference in the time taken to complete a preventive maintenance
action.
 The variation in the preventive maintenance times for each supercomputer is lesser
compared to the variation in the emergency maintenance times. This is as expected,
the variation in a pre-scheduled activity will be less than the variation in an
unplanned activity. The inventory requirements for the preventive maintenance
would be standard and can be arranged for before the activity but in case of
emergency maintenance, the inventory is comparatively unpredictable and may
need time for procurement.
 The variation in emergency maintenance times of Athena is the highest but the least
variation in preventive maintenance times, compared to Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and
Kraken. Thus for Athena, giving an estimate of maintenance time once a failure has
occurred is challenging and is the least predictable but its maintenance time for a
preventive maintenance is the most predictable of all the four supercomputers.
 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is almost twice as that of Athena or Jaguar or Kraken. This
can be attributed to the fact that it is the biggest of the four supercomputers in terms
of architecture and has the highest speed. Nevertheless, more understanding on the
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actual activities performed during a preventive maintenance of Jaguar PF will help
root-cause the reasons and come up with a plan to reduce the preventive
maintenance time.
𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Athena is the least among the four supercomputers and is equal to 2.20
hours, very less compared to that of the other three supercomputers. This may be
the reason for the deteriorating effect on Athena after each preventive maintenance
action.
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AVAILABILITY AND MAINTENANCE POLICY

This chapter discusses the achieved and predicted performance measures of the four
supercomputers. Section 5.1 presents the availability functions and compares the
availability of each supercomputer. Section 5.2 discusses the effectiveness of existing
maintenance policy and proposes new maintenance policy. Section 5.3 summarizes the
work done and the observations to be noted in this chapter.
5.1

Availability

Availability is the probability that a system or component is performing its required
function at a specified point of time or over a specified period of time when operated under
stated conditions. The terms ‘required function’ and ‘stated conditions’ are predefined and
agreed upon by the stake holders. It is the fraction of a time period that an item is in a
condition to perform its intended function upon demand (SEMI, 1986,2004).
5.1.1 Achieved availability
Achieved availability is the average availability of the supercomputer over the period of
time during which the maintenance records are available. It takes both emergency
maintenance and preventive maintenance into account. It is the fraction of time that the
supercomputer is available, of the total time the supercomputer was observed. The
achieved availability of the supercomputer is given by (Availability, 2010) ,

Aa 

Tn
Tn  qMMT 

(33)

where 𝑇𝑛 is the total operating time of the supercomputer and 𝑞(𝑀𝑀𝑇) is the total
maintenance time of the supercomputer, during the period for which the maintenance
records are available. Figure 5 shows the schematic representation of the total operating
time and the total maintenance time. 𝑀𝑀𝑇 is used as the maintenance can be emergency
or preventive and 𝑞 is the total number of expected interrupts given by,
q
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k 1

The values of GPIM parameters, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝜆, and 𝛽 are taken from Table 2, and the value of
𝑀𝑀𝑇 are taken from Table 16, for each of the four supercomputers.
Downtime per year, 𝐷 is a frequently used availability metric. The four supercomputers
run continuously throughout the year, 365 days that is 8760 hours. Thus the downtime per
year in days will be (Vargas, 2000),
D  365(1  Aa )

(35)

Table 17 presents the achieved availability and downtime per year for each of the four
supercomputers. These numbers quantify the availability of each supercomputer during the
time period for which the maintenance records are available. It can be observed that Jaguar
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PF has the least availability and is explained by the fact that it has 175 interrupts, much
higher than the interrupts recorded on each of the other three supercomputers. Also Jaguar
PF has the highest 𝑀𝑀𝑇 contributed by 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of 10.3 hours which is almost twice
compared to 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of the other three supercomputers. This means that Jaguar PF has a
higher percentage of time spend on maintenance compared to that of Athena, Jaguar and
Kraken. Jaguar has the highest availability followed by Athena and Kraken in the
decreasing order.

Table 17: Achieved availability
̂
𝐷
̂𝑎
Supercomputer
𝐴
(days/year)
Athena
0.9701
11
Jaguar
0.9759
9
Jaguar PF
0.9150
31
Kraken
0.9374
23

5.1.2 Predicted point availability
Point availability is the availability of the supercomputer to perform a job at a specified
time point, 𝑡. The point availability is an equivalent term for a repairable system as is
reliability to a component. Reliability of a supercomputer is the probability that the
supercomputer with its hardware and software components is capable of performing its
intended function under normal operating conditions over the specified period of time
(Jane, 1996). Thus, the predicted point availability of the supercomputer at a particular
time, 𝑡 is the probability that it will function satisfactorily without interruption up to and
until time, 𝑡 after the system is restored from the last recorded interrupt.
Let 𝑓(𝑡) be the probability density function of the interrupt distribution, 𝐹(𝑡) be its
cumulative density function and 𝑅(𝑡) be the reliability function. The relation between these
three functions and the failure intensity function is
f (t ) 

dF (t )
dR(t )

 R(t )  (t )
dt
dt

(36)

Let 𝑚(𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ) be the expected number of interrupts in the interval (𝑡1 , 𝑡2 ) and is related to
the failure intensity function by
t2

mt1 , t 2     t dt

(37)

t1

and is related to reliability function by the below equation.
Rt   exp  mt1 , t 2 

(38)

41
The point availability of the supercomputer at time, 𝑡 after the last recorded maintenance
is
Ap t   exp  mGPIM 0, t 
(39)
where, 𝑚𝐺𝑃𝐼𝑀 (0, 𝑡) is the number of expected number of interrupts in the interval (0, 𝑡)
with the failure intensity function modelled by GPIM. The failure intensity function
changes after every maintenance action when it is modelled by GPIM. Thus, to understand
the point availability of the supercomputer after the last recorded interrupt, it is important
to calculate its failure intensity function at the end of its last recorded maintenance. The
number of maintenance records shown in Table 1 and reliability and maintainability
parameters shown in Table 2 are used to compute the failure intensity function of each
supercomputer at the end of the last maintenance action. It has to be noted that the
maintenance records are event terminated and thus the system operating time at the point
of last interrupt is different for each supercomputer. Table 18 presents the failure intensity
function at the end of the last recorded maintenance for each of the four supercomputers.

Table 18: Failure intensity function after the last recorded maintenance
Supercomputer
𝜌(𝑡)
Athena
0.1260𝑡 0.0415
Jaguar
0.0051𝑡 −0.2500
Jaguar PF
0.0153𝑡 0.2063
Kraken
0.0073𝑡 0.0814

Figure 13 shows the variation of point availability of each of the four supercomputers with
the increase in time (from the point of last recorded maintenance). It can be clearly seen
that Jaguar is the most reliable system and Kraken, Jaguar PF, and Athena follow in
decreasing order. The probability that Athena is available to perform a job after 50 hours
of the last recorded maintenance is almost zero. This is because of its high failure intensity
contributed by the scaling factor of 1.6231 after each preventive maintenance. There is
50% probability that Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar PF and Kraken are available to take up a job
after 5 hours, 470 hours, 28 hours, and 73 hours respectively, after the last recorded
maintenance.
5.1.3 Predicted average availability
This section attempts to predict the average availability of the supercomputer for a required
operating time period after the last recorded maintenance observed at an operating time
of 𝑇𝑛 . In order to predict the average availability for a period of time beyond the last
recorded maintenance, it is required to estimate the time points at which emergency
interrupts and preventive interrupts occur. For preliminary analysis it is assumed that
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Figure 13: Point availability vs time

emergency (preventive) interrupts occur at regular intervals with time period equal to the
mean time to emergency (preventive) interrupts, 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐼 (𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑃𝐼) which are estimated
from the available maintenance records.
Let 𝑛𝑒 be the number of emergency interrupts and 𝑛𝑝 be the number of preventive
interrupts during the supercomputer operating time interval (𝑇𝑛 , 𝑡 + 𝑇𝑛 ). The predicted
average availability during this interval, assuming that the supercomputer are maintained
as per the existing maintenance policy is
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The GPIM results presented in Section 3.3 indicate that the preventive maintenance has
positive impact only on Jaguar, thus it is of interest to understand the predicted average
availability of the supercomputer assuming that the preventive maintenance is discontinued
after the last recorded maintenance. In this case, the interruption is only caused due to
emergency maintenance and the predicted average availability is
Apa / emergency 
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The values of GPIM parameters, 𝑟, 𝑠, 𝜆, and 𝛽 are taken from Table 2, and the values of
𝑀𝑀𝑇 and 𝑀𝐸𝑀𝑇 are taken from Table 16, for each of the four supercomputers. Table 19
presents the 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐼 and 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑃𝐼 for each of the four supercomputers. It also presents the
number of emergency and preventive interrupts along with the predicted average
availability for an operating period of 2160 hours, for each of the four supercomputers.

Table 19: Mean time to interrupts and predicted average availability for 2160 hours
Aˆ pa 2160 Aˆ pa / emergency 2160
𝑛
Supercomputer 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝐸𝐼 𝑀𝑇𝑇𝑃𝐼 𝑛
𝑒

Athena
Jaguar
Jaguar PF
Kraken

263.08
183.86
77.57
204.31

1315.38
355.46
359.25
470.78

8
11
27
10

𝑝

1
6
6
4

 

0.7212
0.9783
0.2406
0.7160





0.7573
0.9793
0.3173
0.7890

It can be observed that the predicted average availability of Jaguar PF is the least and Jaguar
is the highest of all the four supercomputers. The predicted average availability considering
that the preventive maintenance is stopped after the last recorded maintenance is higher
than the predicted average availability considering that the existing maintenance policy is
followed, for all the four supercomputers.
5.2

Maintainability

Chapter 4 focuses on the analysis of maintenance times of the four supercomputers and
provides insights into the maintenance in terms of the number of man hours spend on the
maintenance activity. This section reviews the maintenance policy of each supercomputer
based on the reliability and maintenance parameters presented in Table 2 and the different
measures of availability presented in Section 5.1.
Emergency maintenance is performed to restore the supercomputer to normal operating
condition after an occurrence of a failure and thus it cannot be avoided. Preventive
maintenance is performed to effectively identify incipient failures and reduce the
probability of them being actual failures. It is observed that for the existing preventive
maintenance protocol on the four supercomputers is that it is performed at varying
intervals, ranging from 15 to 54 days. Preventive maintenance is intended to reduce the
failure intensity of the supercomputer but contributes to its downtime. Thus an effective
preventive maintenance policy should be scheduled based on:
 the improvement it shows on performance of the supercomputer
 the increase in downtime of the supercomputer
 the consequences of a failure on the supercomputer
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Section 5.2.1 - 5.2.4 comments on the existing maintenance policy and suggests a new
preventive maintenance policy to be considered moving further for Athena, Jaguar, Jaguar
PF and Kraken, respectively.
5.2.1 Athena
Athena is a stable supercomputer with constant failure intensity. With the existing
maintenance policy, the failure intensity of Athena is marginally decreased after every
emergency maintenance action and prominently increased after every preventive
maintenance action. Thus, it is proposed to
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions as they are deteriorating the
system’s performance. This will increase the system availability;
 Root-cause the reasons for the preventive maintenance protocol not being effective;
and
 Continue to monitor the system and watch out for the system phase transition to
‘wear out’ where the system starts deteriorating.
5.2.2 Jaguar
Jaguar is a supercomputer with improving performance. Its failure intensity is not effected
after each emergency maintenance action but is prominently decreased after each
preventive maintenance action. The improvement in the predicted average availability of
the system considering that there is no preventive maintenance is very low as compared to
the predicted average availability considering the existing maintenance policy with both
emergency and preventive maintenance. The increase is only 0.1% considering the
predicted average availability for an operating period of 3 months. Thus, it is proposed that
the existing maintenance policy be continued on Jaguar.
5.2.3 Jaguar PF
Jaguar PF is a supercomputer with deteriorating performance. Its failure intensity is not
effected by each maintenance action, be it emergency or preventive maintenance. The
improvement in the predicted average availability of the system considering that there is
no preventive maintenance is prominent as compared to the predicted average availability
considering the existing maintenance policy with both emergency and preventive
maintenance. The increase is about 32% considering the predicted average availability for
an operating period of 3 months. This shows that though the preventive maintenance is not
altering the failure intensity of Jaguar PF, it is contributing to the system downtime. Thus,
it is proposes to
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions;
 Root-cause the reasons for the preventive maintenance protocol not being effective
and come up with an improved protocol. As Jaguar PF is inherently deteriorating,
an effective preventive maintenance protocol can help to improve its performance;
and
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Continue to monitor the system. There may be a point where the rate of
deterioration is so high that it is required to revamp the system.

5.2.4 Kraken
Kraken is a stable supercomputer with constant failure intensity. Its failure intensity is not
effected after each emergency maintenance action and is marginally decreased after every
preventive maintenance action. The improvement in the predicted average availability of
the system considering that there is no preventive maintenance is prominent as compared
to the predicted average availability considering the existing maintenance policy with both
emergency and preventive maintenance. The increase is about 10% considering the
predicted average availability for an operating period of 3 months. This shows that the
decrease in failure intensity of Kraken after each preventive maintenance does not justify
its increase in system downtime. Thus, it is proposes to
 Stop performing preventive maintenance actions as the existing protocol does not
help in improving the system performance;
 Continue to monitor the system and watch out for the system phase transition to
‘wear out’ where the system starts deteriorating.
5.3

Summary

The achieved availability, predicted point availability and predict average availability for
an operating period of 3 month after the last recorded maintenance are estimated and
presented for each of the four supercomputers. The maintenance policy of each
supercomputer is reviewed and it is proposed that the preventive maintenance should not
be performed on Athena, Jaguar PF and Kraken as it does not improve their performance.
It is concluded that the existing maintenance policy of Jaguar is good and should be
continued.
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CONCLUSION

First, Section 6.1 summarizes the work done in this thesis along with a brief overview of
the analysis approach. Section 6.2 presents the proposed maintenance policy for each of
the four supercomputers. Finally, Section 6.3 discusses the scope for future study.
6.1

Summary of Thesis

The demand to analyze the maintenance records of four supercomputers, Athena, Jaguar,
Jaguar PF and Kraken, collected over the period from October 2009 to December 2010
forms the motivation to this thesis. These supercomputers are located and operated at The
National Institute for Computational Sciences in Oak Ridge National Lab, Tennessee, US.
Each supercomputer is a considered as a complex repairable system with the occurrence of
events causing interruption to normal system operation being modelled by stochastic point
process. In order to understand the system performance characteristics such as reliability,
availability, and maintainability it is important to fit a mathematical/statistical model to the
available maintenance record data. Different maintenance models to analyze the repairable
systems available in literature are broadly classified into maximal maintenance model,
minimal maintenance model, and partial maintenance model. These models are reviewed
and compared. Partial maintenance model that provides the scope to include the
effectiveness of maintenance actions has been considered to be more appropriate to analyze
the four supercomputers.
Different approaches to model the partial maintenance models proposed in literature have
been reviewed. Among these, GPIM and GARM are the appropriate models to
maintenance data that contain both emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance,
as is the case with the four supercomputers and allows inclusion of both reliability and
maintainability parameters in a single model. Finally, GPIM is chosen to be the main model
for this thesis as it provides more practical physical model and higher potential for
maintenance decision making than GARM and has the possibility to accommodate future
extensions to this study, such as including predictor variables and covariates.
The reliability and maintenance parameters of GPIM that fits the maintenance records are
obtained based on MLE method, using MATLAB, for each supercomputer. Based on the
reliability parameter estimates it has been observed that Athena and Kraken are stable,
while Jaguar is improving and Jaguar PF is deteriorating. The maintenance parameter
estimates show that each emergency maintenance marginally decreases the failure intensity
of Athena and marginally increases the failure intensity of Jaguar, Jaguar PF, and Kraken.
Each preventive maintenance marginally decreases the failure intensity of Jaguar PF, and
Kraken, prominently increases the failure intensity of Athena and prominently decreased
the failure intensity of Jaguar.
While the occurrence of events interrupting supercomputer’s normal operation are
modelled using GPIM, the maintenance times are modelled by life distributions. The best
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life distributions fitting the maintenance times, considering only the emergency repairs,
only the preventive maintenance, and both emergency and preventive maintenance times
are selected using AICc and BIC model selection measures. The parameters of the chosen
distributions are estimated using MLE methods. It has been observed that the variation in
emergency maintenance times are higher that on the preventive maintenance, for all the
four supercomputers. The 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of Jaguar PF is distinctly higher than the 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 of the
other three supercomputers. The 𝑀𝑃𝑀𝑇 values of the four supercomputers are distinctly
different and can be attributed to the difference in size of the supercomputers.
Achieved availability and predicted availability for each supercomputer are estimated
using maintenance time distributions along with GPIM results. Jaguar PF has the least
achieved availability and the least predicted average availability. Athena has the least point
availability. Jaguar has the highest achieved availability, point availability and predicted
average availability showing that it is the most reliable system of all the four
supercomputers.
6.2

Proposed Maintenance Policy

The supercomputers operate continuously and are only interrupted by emergency
maintenance or preventive maintenance. The maintenance team plan is to perform
preventive maintenance on each of the four supercomputers, once every two weeks. But, it
is observed from the maintenance records that the preventive maintenance has not been
done at regular intervals on any of the four supercomputers. It may be due to some practical
difficulties and may depend on the existing work load on the supercomputers, etc. So the
existing maintenance policy is the one modelled by GPIM based on the maintenance
records. Based on the study of the existing maintenance records and observation of the
system performance and maintenance effectiveness, a new maintenance policy that
improves the availability of the supercomputers and reduces the maintenance costs is
proposed.
The proposed maintenance policy for each supercomputer is given below.
 Continue the existing emergency maintenance protocol and stop performing preventive
maintenance for Athena, Jaguar PF, and Kraken,
 Continue the existing emergency maintenance and preventive maintenance protocols
for Jaguar.
 Jaguar PF is a deteriorating system and the predicted average availability for an
operating period of 3 months considered after the last recorded maintenance is less than
32%, which is very low for a supercomputer. Thus, Jaguar PF may need a revamp.
 Continue to monitor Athena and Kraken to detect any phase transition from stationary
to wear out, where they may show an increasing failure rate.
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6.3

Future Scope

The analysis of maintenance records studied in this thesis provides good insights into the
system performance and failure characteristics of the four supercomputers. Future
extension of this thesis can be in the direction:
 It has to be noted that the proposed maintenance policy is based on the maintenance
records available during the period from October 2009 to December 2010. The system
performance characteristics might have changed since then and it is important to use
the GPIM to fit the latest maintenance records and form the base for a new maintenance
policy proposal.
 A computerized maintenance management system can be used to dynamically model
the interrupts and monitor the supercomputer based on the GPIM and the corresponding
availability analysis.
 Linking the statistical model governing the maintenance records to the inventory is one
other practical use. It is required to understand the failures and their causes at a cluster
or module level to explore solutions of improving supercomputer availability and
suggest better ways to handle the spare parts.
 It is observed there is a drastic difference in the way a preventive maintenance action
affects each supercomputer. Also, there is lot of variation observed in the preventive
maintenance times of each supercomputer. This can be due to the fact that the
preventive maintenance protocol is different for each supercomputer or the same
preventive maintenance protocol for all the supercomputers is not an effective strategy.
Root-cause analysis performed on this should provide direction for a more effective
preventive maintenance.
 Supercomputers take up huge space and have stringent cooling requirements; in this
context further work can be done to understand the spatial locations of the failures to
figure out any location correlations. Workload and failure correlations, failure
clustering, time span of works run and failure correlations, failure statistics with respect
to categories like human error, environmental effects, etc. are some important areas to
consider for better understanding of failures.
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